The 13 Reasons why……….

……..England are no 1 in the world.

History

For various reasons – the legacy of the Empire; the Commonwealth; EU laws – England have a larger pool of talent to select from than ever before. Some – mainly embittered Australians, South Africans and Indians – argue that this has devalued England’s success, but it is surely positive that the England team reflects the multi-cultural, mobile society which it represents. Perhaps the South African influence is disproportionately stronger than the Asian influence, but time will no doubt change that. Besides, those that complain about the ‘united nations’ nature of the current England team would do well to consider the alternative: a system where players from different cultures are alienated and excluded.

Weak playing age and the failure of others

It may seem churlish, but a strong case could be made to suggest we are in a relatively weak playing age. World cricket has few, if any, of the ferocious fast bowlers that dominated in the 70s and 80s, the era of the great spinners has just about come to an end and several teams – Pakistan, West Indies and Zimbabwe – have been beset with in-fighting that undermines the talent they continue to produce.

Even India, a side blessed with immense batting ability, seems to be suffering from a lack of fitness and for prioritising limited-overs cricket, while Australia are reeling from the loss of several great players within a short space of time (Shane Warne, Glenn McGrath et al.) and some muddled selections. South Africa, meanwhile, have been hindered – in the short-term, anyway – by their quota system.

It leaves England as one of the few teams that is no longer guilty of self-harm. They are, perhaps, the only team that have given themselves the best chance of succeeding.

Lord MacLaurin:

Much in the Raising the Standard (August 1997) document that MacLaurin produced as a blueprint for the future of the English game was naïve. For example, it rejected two division cricket and instead backed the three conference system and a 14-game Championship. It also suggested that amateur, club cricketers would play for England.

But MacLaurin understood one thing very clearly: the viability of the game in England and Wales was utterly dependent upon the success of the England team. However obvious that seems now, it wasn’t at the time.

The single act of refocusing all efforts on the betterment of the England side led to everything that followed. It led to an on-going argument with the counties, to the introduction of central contracts, two divisions, higher salaries, better training and coaches and countless other improvements. It might just have been the key episode in the resurgence of English cricket

Chris Smith:

Not an obvious choice, perhaps, but Smith, the Labour Government’s cultural secretary from 1997-2001, made an important contribution. For it was Smith, at the behest of MacLaurin, who made the decision to remove cricket from the ‘A List’ of events that could only be shown on terrestrial (as it was then) television.

This remains a controversial decision. Critics point out – quite reasonably – that the decision to allow SKY to buy exclusive rights has denied some children of the opportunity to watch any live cricket. In the long-term, therefore, there is a concern that it could jeopardise the number of future cricket lovers.

The fact is, however, that the decision enabled the ECB to sell TV rights for vastly increased sums. Indeed, their turnover almost quadrupled. That afforded the possibility of central contracts, specialist coaches, the improvements at Loughborough and countless other advances. Even since the Ashes success of 2005, the England budget has more then doubled from £11m to over £25m

Whatever the long-term effects – and they remain debatable – it is doubtful that England would be No. 1 now unless Smith had been persuaded to allow free-market bidding for cricket’s TV rights.

Peter Moores:

A glance at the stats will suggest that Moores’ reign as England coach (April 07-January 09) was not a success. England were defeated at home by India – their first home series defeat for six years – before going on to lose to Sri Lanka (away) and South Africa (home) and then, finally, in India again.  However, Moores planted seeds that blossomed under Flower. It was, after all, Moores that recalled Graeme Swann and James Anderson. Moores also brought in Matt Prior, Andy Flower and Richard Halsall, who were to play a huge part in the more professional and better prepared England teams that subsequently emerged. Peter Moores is quietly emerging as one of the unsung heroes of English cricket.

Four-day cricket:

Although the advent of four-day cricket far preceded any improvement in the England team (it was first trialled from 1988-1992 and, from 1993 all Championship matches have been scheduled over four days), it took tome for the effects to filter down into every aspect of the game.

It led to tougher cricket, played on better pitches. It led to bowlers learning how to take wickets on flat surfaces and batsmen learning to build innings over time. And it led to players learning to fight to draw games. In short, it helped bridged the gap between the domestic and international game.

It’s a point that might send some warnings to England as they look to the future: changes made to the domestic game now could come back to haunt English cricket in a decade or more. Therefore the ECB should think very carefully before tinkering any more with the Championship.

Two-division cricket:

The advent of two-division cricket in 2000 changed the complexion of the Championship. In the early days of promotion and relegation, three sides were promoted  – and relegated – each season, so almost every game had meaning.

That was a huge culture change. Before that, the Championship was awash with ‘dead’ games, leading to a surfeit of soft cricket. Sides often lacked motivation and the cricket sometimes lacked intensity. The introduction of two divisions helped English cricket develop a tougher core.

Central contracts and continuity of selection

In the Ashes drubbing of 1989, England used 29 players. In 1993, they used 24. In 20-11 they used only 13 and that’s despite an injury to Stuart Broad.

In the past, England squandered their most talented cricketers. They destroyed their self confidence, wore them out and instilled such a fear of failure that many were reduced to nervous wrecks. Few would argue this is the most talented XI England team they’ve seen. Is Cook more talented than Hick; Bresnan more talented than Caddick? Might Ramprakash not, with better management, have scored as many Test runs as Bell?

Now, however, England are maximising the ability of most of their players. Much of that is due to central contracts which have allowed the likes of James Anderson to rest and arrive for international matches in peak condition.

It’s not just about rest and practise, either. It’s about sticking with players during the inevitable dips of form they will experience – remember Alastair Cook ahead of the Ashes of 2010-11 – and instilling a culture of ‘team England.’ As Graeme Swann point out in the last issue of SPIN: “We are much more together now. Back then [before central contracts and continuity of selection] there was quite an insular, selfish feel to the team. There were cliques. It wasn’t 11 guys playing for one another. It was six or seven guys playing that way and four or five playing for themselves.”

Youth teams, the Academy and Lions:

Age group teams and Lions tours have been common for a few years, but the development process has become far more sophisticated and co-ordinated in recent years. These days, the development of the best players is monitored from the time they are in their early teens and the progression from U19s, in particular, through the Academy and onto the Lions and the England side is smooth and predictable.

Not only does this allow the management to not just monitor and assess the best developing players, but it enables them to instil the desired skills, disciplines and culture.

Just as importantly, this helps the players feel comfortable in the environment. When he first made it into the England team – in T20 cricket in 2007 – Jonathan Trott admits to feeling uncomfortable. He knew few of his team-mates and he didn’t know what was expected of him.

By the time he reappeared, in 2009, he had spent more time within the England environment, knew most of his colleagues in the dressing room and he already knew to expect of them and what was expected of him.

Attention to detail and specialist coaching:

The days when England simply selected the best side and trusted to luck are long gone. The planning and preparation extends far beyond the obvious, too. So while the likes of Graham Gooch (batting), David Saker (bowling) Richard Halsall (fielding), Brue French (wicketkeeping) deserve huge credit for their work, there’s a team of unsung analysts, bio-mechanists and other experts who have provided excellent service.

Consider, for example, the work of analyst Nathan Leamon. He’s a maths graduate from Cambridge University who works at the National Cricket Performance Centre at Loughborough. This summer he provided England’s bowlers with a series of colour-coded pitch maps split into 20 sections which detailed how each Indian batsmen would deal with deliveries pitched in each area. It’s typical of the attention to detail which Andy Flower has developed from reading the book Moneyball – Michael Lewis’s book on the importance of learning from statistics in Baseball.

From the tests that showed that Alastair Cook sweated least of all England players (a fact which persuaded the team to use him as ‘ball holder’ when trying to gain reverse swing) to utilising Dukes balls from 2009 (as they swing more), England are now squeezing every ounce of ability from their team. With four England batsmen rated in the top 10 of the Test rankings and five England bowlers in the top 11, it appears to be working.

Hurt:

1999 was, arguably, the lowest moment in the history of English cricket. Humiliated at the World Cup they hosted – England were eliminated even before the tournament’s theme song was released – the Test team were then booed by their own supporters when they lost to New Zealand at The Oval and plummeted to ninth in the Test rankings.

But humiliation and revenge are powerful motivational devices. Years of losses – not least the embarrassing Ashes whitewash of 2006-07 – had filled the whole of English cricket with a ravenous hunger for success. Not only were the players fully motivated, the ECB were happy to fund the central contracts, the support staff, the longer tour and increased number of warm-up matches, the modern coaching devices and training camps that have all contributed to this success. English cricket, stung by years of hurt, has been overhauled in recent years and is much the better for it.

This success has been a long time coming.

The Indian Cricket League, Stanford et al.

The ‘rebel’ ICL is destined to be a footnote in cricketing history. But it is significant, nevertheless. While Lalit Modi denies it (he may well take credit for inventing the sun, the moon and stars), the ICL was the forerunner of the IPL. It showed what a T20 league could be and created a template for the IPL.

It was also relevant because, without the threat of ‘rebel’ cricket, the ICC would never have implemented the widespread use of No Objection Certificates (no player can participate in any cricket these days without their national board granting such a certificate), which would have left the ECB powerless to prevent players going to the IPL – or anywhere else.

The Stanford event may also be relevant. It appears history will not remember this chapter kindly but, had it not happened, it is possible that the power brokers in India would have felt able to steamroller their own interests in the knowledge that no-one had any other options. While the Stanford event ended in tears, it did, at least, provide leverage to use against the BCCI. Without it, the IPL – and the BCCI – would be even more powerful than they are now.

Fortune:

Some at the ECB may pretend that the appointment of the two Andys was a masterstroke. It’s not so. Actually, Flower and Strauss were thrust together when every other option had been exhausted. England had, remember, tried Andrew Flintoff and Kevin Pietersen as captain before Strauss. And they had appointed Peter Moores before Flower. Only when KP and Moores were sacked and England were left with no time and no options was Flower appointed as an interim. The truth is, the ECB stumbled upon the right combination.